



Department of Defense INSTRUCTION

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ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT: Security Classification of Airborne Sensor Imagery and Imaging Systems

- References:
- (a) DoD Instruction 5210.52, "Security Classification of Airborne Sensor Imagery," September 26, 1973 (hereby canceled)
 - (b) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," June 1986, authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7, 1982
 - (c) DoD Instruction 5210.51, "Security Classification Concerning Airborne Passive Scanning Infrared Imaging Systems," September 26, 1973 (hereby canceled)
 - (d) DoD Instruction 5210.57, "Security Classification Concerning Airborne Radar Imaging System," September 26, 1973 (hereby canceled)
 - (e) through (k), see enclosure 1

A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Instruction:

1. Reissues reference (a) to implement revisions to reference (b).
2. Consolidates into one document references (c) and (d).
3. Updates policy, procedures, and responsibilities.

B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Instruction:

1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments (including their National Guard and Reserve components), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD Components").
2. Will be incorporated to the extent applicable into contracts of DoD Components.
3. Applies to U.S. Government Agencies and approved non-Government users as a condition for receiving imaging systems information from DoD Components.
4. Applies to all airborne sensor imagery and imaging systems produced by or for any element of the Department of Defense.

C. DEFINITIONS

Terms used in this Instruction are defined in enclosure 2.

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D. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

1. All imagery and intelligence information derived from imagery shall be made available to all DoD Components, other Government Agencies, and non-Government users at the lowest practical security classification, shall be declassified expediently, and shall be consistent with U.S. national security.

2. All imaging systems and items of information about them shall remain classified when U.S. national security might be damaged by uncontrolled dissemination after declassification. It is DoD policy to declassify radar, infrared, television, and photographic equipment expediently to ease non-DoD use.

3. Access to classified information shall be on a need-to-know basis to authorized persons. The need-to-know principle should operate in the regular (collateral) system, keeping special access programs to a minimum. DoD Components shall not use terms such as "Sensitive" or "LIMDIS" as classification designators for imagery or imaging system information instead of an approved special access program.

4. The concept of areas of special interest (ASI) (formerly the consolidated classification list) shall continue to provide security to specified sensitive areas or activities. The number and extent of ASI shall be reduced as much as possible, consistent with the interests of U.S. national security.

E. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (DUSD(P)) shall:

- a. Maintain a list of ASI designated by non-DoD Government Agencies.
- b. Notify the Secretary of the Air Force of all changes to the ASI lists submitted by non-DoD Government Agencies.
- c. Request that all non-DoD Government Agencies review their previously established ASI to report changes.

2. The Secretary of the Air Force shall:

- a. Maintain the ASI master list.
- b. Make the list available to all interested Government Agencies.

3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

- a. Establish ASI within or outside of the United States where imagery has special security significance.
- b. Review previously established ASI and notify the Secretary of the Air Force within 30 days of any changes.

4. The Heads of DoD Components shall:

a. Establish ASI within or outside of the United States where imagery has special security significance.

b. Review previously designated ASI and notify the Secretary of the Air Force within 30 days of any changes.

c. Classify or declassify imagery, imaging systems, and imagery-derived information under DoD 5200.1-R (reference (b)) and under this Instruction.

F. PROCEDURES

1. Imagery, Imagery Products, and Imagery-derived Products

a. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products are divided geographically into five categories for security classification, as follows:

(1) Category A. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products covering the United States, U.S. territories and possessions, and Puerto Rico, including coastal waters and all other waters considered U.S. territorial waters.

(2) Category B. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products covering installations located in foreign areas that are used by, leased by, or are under the control of, the United States, and foreign territory occupied by the United States either in time of war or under United Nations mandate.

(3) Category C. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products covering foreign national landmasses, coastal areas, and internal and adjacent waters where, by international agreement, the United States has authority to obtain imagery.

(4) Category D. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products covering international landmasses and bodies of water that are not under any national jurisdiction and are so recognized under international law.

(5) Category E. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products not defined in categories A. through D. (subparagraphs F.1.a.(1) through F.1.a.(4), above).

b. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products are divided functionally into four classes, as follows:

(1) Class 1. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products intended for intelligence purposes.

(2) Class 2. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products intended for mapping, charting, and geodetic purposes.

(3) Class 3. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products intended for official Government purposes other than classes 1 and 2.

(4) Class 4. Imagery, imagery products, and imagery-derived products intended for any unclassified use.

c. Enclosure 3 outlines specific procedures for determining the classification of imagery and imagery-derived products by category and class. Imagery and imagery-derived products may require classification if disclosure might cause damage to U.S. national security by:

(1) Reducing U.S. capabilities to acquire the imagery by revealing any of the following:

(a) The ability of, or occasion for, the United States to acquire the imagery.

(b) The availability of equipment capable of taking the imagery in the geographical area covered.

(c) The source or means of acquisition that may compromise U.S. military planning, jeopardize U.S. foreign relations, provide hostile or potentially hostile interests with an incentive or a basis for invoking or planning countermeasures, eliminate a valuable element of surprise or other U.S. advantage, or compromise the means by which the imagery was obtained.

(2) Revealing intelligence interests or requirements, such as the following:

(a) Compromising the sources.

(b) Revealing the field, scope, or fact of intelligence interest or requirements.

(c) Revealing the results.

(d) Disclosing the analyses or syntheses of the result of several efforts.

(e) Disclosing the nature of the intelligence portrayed or the geographic area coverage by the imager.

(f) Revealing U.S. military planning, purpose, or direction of intelligence efforts.

(3) Compromising international agreements, commitments, and foreign sovereign rights by revealing the existence of an international arrangement between the United States and one or more foreign nations, particularly U.S. allies, if the disclosure of imagery might result in the cancellation or limitation of beneficial international arrangements, military or other actions against the United States or U.S. allies, or nullify advantages afforded to the United States by reason of the international arrangements.

(4) Revealing significant details of U.S., allied, or friendly military bases, installations, or targets by revealing significant details of military bases and installations; troop and equipment movements, location, or concentrations; or terrain features or topographic details in an area having

military interest. The imagery might provide hostile or potentially hostile interests with useful information otherwise not available or readily accessible, provide a basis for strategic or tactical attack planning against the United States or U.S. ally, or reveal U.S. military planning data.

(5) Revealing equipment characteristics through technical analysis of the imagery, which would indicate classified performance capabilities of equipment used in acquiring, producing, or collecting the imagery.

d. If none of these conditions are present, the imagery and derived products shall be unclassified.

e. To the extent imagery or imagery-derived products also may contain or reveal critical technology, it shall be controlled under DoD Directive 5230.25 (reference (e)) when it is unclassified or after it is declassified.

2. Imaging Systems

a. The critical elements of imaging systems essential for successful performance are listed in subparagraphs F.2.a.(1) through F.2.a.(10), below. These parameters largely control the military value of the system for classification purposes.

(1) Frequency association, frequency agility, and frequency stability.

(2) Maximum range.

(3) Moving target indication capability.

(4) Range swath.

(5) Swath width.

(6) System resolution.

(7) System capability to perform in various lighting and weather conditions.

(8) System dynamic range capability.

(9) System sensitivity and image quality.

(10) System clutter rejection and sidelobe rejection capability.

b. In determining the classification of documentation or hardware, keep in mind that these critical elements are interdependent variables and that all may not apply to any one system. Use the critical elements and other factors, along with enclosure 3, to determine the classification of imaging systems. Precisely identify all items of equipment and information about this equipment requiring protection. As a complete item of equipment, an imaging system is classified because of its operational capabilities, limitations, or vulnerabilities. The overall classification of a complete system may be higher

than each individual item or fact about it. The existence of a system also may require classification. An item of hardware does not require classification only because it is a part of a classified product or effort.

c. Listed in subparagraphs F.2.c.(1) through F.2.c.(8), below, are other factors that influence the classification of imaging systems:

(1) Nomenclature, which by itself does not disclose the type or status of development of the system, is unclassified.

(2) If all classified items in an imaging system are removed, the remainder of the system is unclassified.

(3) Capabilities and quality of systems and components may be classified if they provide a military advantage or a significant technological advantage.

(4) Limitations require classification on the same basis as capabilities.

(5) Manufacturing techniques may require classification if considered critical to the successful production and are the exclusive knowledge of the Department of Defense and DoD contractors. It also is proper to classify such data to preserve lead time that the United States has in the fabrication of such systems.

(6) Vulnerabilities require classification to the extent that knowledge of them might contribute to the development of countermeasures.

(7) Countermeasures without known counter-countermeasures shall be classified.

(8) Commercially or openly available components are not classifiable. The association of unclassified components with specific systems may require classification.

d. To the extent critical elements of information on imaging systems also may contain or reveal critical technology, they shall be controlled under DoD Directive 5230.25 (reference (e)) when they are unclassified or after they are declassified.

e. Enclosure 4 outlines guidance for producing classification guides for all plans, programs, projects, or operations involving imagery. Each guide clearly shall identify information, equipment, or imagery that needs special levels of classification.

3. Foreign Disclosure

a. All releases of classified information to foreign governments and international organizations shall be in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.11 (reference (f)).

b. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has published documents on foreign disclosure aspects of specific imaging programs. Consult these publications for guidance.

c. In the absence of written guidance, consult DIA (DI-6B) through the chain of command.

d. Enclosures 5 and 6 detail procedures for sanitizing, downgrading, declassifying, and public release of imagery.

4. Areas of Special Interest

a. ASI shall include military and naval installations designated by E.O. 10104 (reference (g)), when it is necessary to exercise security control over imagery of these installations. Include other installations when notification of intention to overfly or image is necessary because of ongoing classified testing or activities, although the installation is not classified. Report the designations of such ASI promptly to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Department of the Air Force. Such reports shall identify the specific areas and indicate a contact point for information, the minimum classification to be assigned to the imagery, and justification for designation.

b. ASI designated by other Government Agencies shall be reported to the Director, Counterintelligence and Investigative Programs, Office of the DUSD(P) (ODUSD(P)). The ASI shall identify the specific areas, the Agency making the designation, the contact point in that Agency, and the minimum classification to be assigned to imagery of the areas. Changes in these areas and the classification assigned to their imagery shall be made only by, or with the approval of, the designating Agency.

5. Classification of ASI

Any imagery of ASI designated under subsection F.4., above, shall be treated as follows:

a. Categories A. and B. imagery (see paragraphs F.1.a.(1) and F.1.a.(2), above) shall be submitted for review to the DoD Component or other Government Agency that designated the ASI. Pending the issuance of classification guidance from that DoD Component or Agency, the originator shall:

(1) Safeguard the information or material as prescribed for the intended classification.

(2) Obtain a classification evaluation under DoD 5200.1-R, chapter 2, section 6 (reference (b)).

b. When the imagery must be classified to protect classified information about the equipment or the means of acquisition, the imagery shall be classified no lower than the level required to protect such information. The DoD Component or other Government Agency responsible for providing such protection shall determine the classification.

c. When the imagery must be classified to protect information about the ASI, it shall be classified no lower than the level required to protect such information. Final determination of this factor is the prerogative of the DoD Component or other Government Agency that designated the ASI.

d. The ultimate classification of the imagery shall be the highest of the classifications determined under paragraphs F.5.a. through F.5.c., above.

G. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

This Instruction is effective immediately. Forward three copies of the implementing documents to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) within 120 days.



Thomas P. Quinn
Principal Deputy ASD(C3I)

Enclosures - 6

1. References
2. Definitions
3. Classification Considerations
4. Classification Guides
5. Sanitization of Airborne Sensor Imagery
6. Downgrading, Declassification, and Public Release

REFERENCES, continued

- (e) DoD Directive 5230.25, "Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data From Public Disclosure," November 6, 1984
- (f) DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," December 31, 1984
- (g) Executive Order 10104, "Defining Certain Vital Military and Naval Installations and Equipment as Requiring Protection Against the General Dissemination of Information Relative Thereto," February 1, 1950
- (h) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982
- (i) DoD 5200.1-H, "Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification Guidance," March 1986, authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7, 1982
- (j) DoD Directive 2040.2, "International Transfers of Technology, Goods, Services, and Munitions," January 17, 1984
- (k) DoD Directive 5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release," April 2, 1982

DEFINITIONS

1. Airborne Sensor. A technical device designed to detect and respond to one or more particular stimuli, which may record and/or transmit a resultant response for interpretation or measurement, and is carried aboard a manned or unmanned platform operating in the earth's atmosphere.
2. Classification. An initial determination that information requires, in the interest of U.S. security, protection against unauthorized disclosure, together with a classification designation signifying the level of protection required.
3. Collateral. All U.S. security information classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET under E.O. 12356 (reference (h)), excluding information specifically designated by the Secretaries of Defense or the Military Departments as particularly sensitive and requiring protection within a special access program.
4. Declassification. The determination that in the interest of U.S. national security, classified information no longer requires any degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, together with removal or cancellation of the classification designation.
5. Downgrade. A determination that classified information requires, in the interest of U.S. national security, a lower degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, together with a changing of the classified designation to reflect such lower degree of protection.
6. Imagery. Collectively, the representation of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media. For security classification purposes, this term includes exposed or recorded media not yet processed chemically or electronically to a state of visibility or utility.
7. Imagery-Derived Products. Information or intelligence products derived from imagery in other than photographic form (includes textual reports, tables, graphics, cables, messages, and oral information).
8. Imagery Products. Image reproductions in less than full frame format WITHOUT titling and marginal data (includes photographic prints, vugraphs, and transparencies).
9. Imaging System. The resources and procedures used to collect imagery in any band of the electromagnetic spectrum.
10. Sanitization. The process of editing, or otherwise altering, intelligence or intelligence information to protect sensitive sources, methods, and analytical capabilities so as to permit greater dissemination of the data.

CLASSIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS

A. This enclosure provides guidance for assigning the classification to imagery and imaging systems. The classification shall be applicable to protect the highest classified information. This guidance, when compared to a specific category and class, shall result in a more objective determination of classification.

1. Category A. Areas under U.S. sovereignty.

a. Class 1 imagery (intelligence).

(1) Intelligence interests have primary significance. Follow guidance furnished by DIA, National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), or the initiating Agency.

(2) Consider also equipment capabilities, target or military data, and ASI.

b. Class 2 imagery (mapping and charting).

(1) Ordinarily, such imagery may be unclassified, subject to the considerations noted in subparagraphs A.1.b.(2) and A.1.b.(3), below.

(2) If classified U.S. capabilities or classified equipment capabilities may be learned from studying the imagery, the level of classification needed to protect those capabilities shall be applied to the imagery.

(3) If target or military data or ASI are covered by the imagery, the level of classification needed to protect such information shall be applied to the imagery.

c. Class 3 imagery (official purposes).

(1) Ordinarily, this imagery may be unclassified, subject to the same considerations in subparagraphs A.1.b.(2) and A.1.b.(3), above.

d. Class 4 imagery (non-Department of Defense).

Such imagery shall be unclassified or declassified before release to the user or requestor. Give particular attention to sanitization. (See enclosure 5.)

2. Category B. Foreign areas under U.S. authority.

a. Class 1 imagery (intelligence).

(1) Intelligence interests have primary significance. Follow guidance furnished by DIA, NSA/CSS, or the initiating Agency.

(2) Consider equipment capabilities and target or military data.

b. Classes 2 and 3 imagery (mapping, charting, and other official purposes).

(1) Consider classified U.S. capabilities and equipment capabilities.

(2) Target or military data considerations may require consideration separately from international requirements.

c. Class 4 imagery (non-Department of Defense).

This imagery shall be unclassified or declassified before release to the user or the requestor. Give particular attention to sanitization. (See enclosure 5.)

3. Category C. Areas under foreign sovereignty where, by international agreement, the United States has authority to obtain imagery.

a. Class 1 imagery (intelligence).

(1) Intelligence interests have primary significance. Follow guidance furnished by DIA, NSA/CSS, or the initiating Agency.

(2) Consider the requirements of the international agreement or commitment that authorized the United States to acquire the imagery.

(3) Consider equipment capabilities and target or military data.

b. Classes 2 or 3 imagery (mapping charting, or other official purposes).

(1) The requirements of the international agreement or commitment under which the imagery was acquired have primary significance.

(2) Of equal significance are classified U.S. capabilities and equipment capabilities.

(3) Consider also target and military data.

c. Class 4 imagery (non-Department of Defense).

(1) Ordinarily, such imagery should be unclassified or declassified before release to the user or requestor.

(2) Requirements of the international agreement or commitment under which the imagery was acquired may make classification necessary, even though sanitization and declassification under U.S. standards may be possible.

(3) Sanitization procedures completely satisfying the international agreement may be possible to permit unclassified release.

4. Category D. Foreign areas not under any national sovereignty.

a. Class 1 imagery (intelligence).

(1) Intelligence interests have primary significance. Follow guidance furnished by DIA, NSA/CSS, or the initiating Agency.

(2) Consider classified U.S. capabilities and equipment capabilities.

(3) Consider also target and military data aspects.

b. Classes 2 (mapping and charting), 3 (official purposes), and 4 (non-DoD) imagery.

Treat the same as category A., above; classes 2, 3, and 4 imagery, respectively.

5. Category E. Imagery not covered in categories A. through D., above.

Only class 1 imagery (intelligence) shall be involved in category E. Consequently, intelligence considerations shall control classification of this imagery.

CLASSIFICATION GUIDES

A. Under DoD 5200.1-R, chapter 2, section 4 (reference (b)), for each plan, program, project, or operation involving imagery, a classification guide consistent with this Instruction shall be prepared and maintained that clearly identifies the items of information, equipment, or imagery that warrant specified levels of classification. Each guide shall:

1. Be prepared and maintained by the initiator of the plan, program, project, or operation. When required, a guide may be prepared by the office responsible for the execution of the plan, program, project, or operation.

2. Be based on classification determinations made or approved by applicable classification authorities.

3. Include guidance issued by and coordinated with the office or offices having knowledge of, interest in, or control over the following:

- a. The intelligence and international aspects of the efforts.
- b. The subject matter of the imagery obtained.
- c. The equipment used.

4. Be specific and sufficiently detailed to enable users to understand what information requires classification.

5. Be available to all users.

6. Provide for sanitization and, if possible, for unclassified use without the need to contact the initiator or the procuring activity.

B. For class 1 imagery, the DIA and NSA/CSS shall issue guidance to enable the initiators of the plans, programs, projects, or operations to include in their classification guidance clear identification of the information that must be classified to protect intelligence interests. In the absence of such guidance, the initiator or the activity that acquires the imagery shall indicate what information needs classification to protect intelligence interests.

C. For all classes and categories of imagery, the initiator of the plan, program, project, or operation shall provide proper identification of the information that needs classification to protect the following:

1. U.S. capabilities.
2. International considerations based on treaties, agreements, commitments, and local arrangements between U.S. missions and foreign governments that may limit the acquisition, dissemination, or use of the imagery.
3. Details of the subject matter shown in the imagery and in ASI, as discussed in subsection D.4. and in section E. of this Instruction.

4. Capabilities of the equipment used that have been classified by the DoD activity responsible for the equipment.

D. Practical considerations based on conditions at the acquisition site may affect the classification to be applied to the imagery obtained. When possible, consider the following factors when preparing the classification guidance for the plan, program, project, or operation. The acquiring activity may weigh and apply them to the imagery.

1. The availability, including capability and opportunity, of other nations to acquire the same imagery.

2. The known or reasonably suspected availability of the same imagery to other nations, particularly those that are hostile and might use the imagery to the detriment of the United States.

3. The means available to protect the area covered by imagery from airborne surveillance.

4. The concealment of critical or classifiable installations, activities, or terrain features from airborne surveillance.

E. Review also DoD 5200.1-H (reference (i)). Security classification guides developed according to this Instruction must list militarily critical technology as provided in DoD Directive 2040.2 (reference (j)).

SANITIZATION OF AIRBORNE SENSOR IMAGERY

A. This enclosure suggests ways to sanitize imagery, permitting downgrading or declassification. Before sanitizing, determine that the imagery shall not reveal classified capabilities of the equipment by the resolution of detail and definition of the imagery, without elaborating documentation. Imagery may be sanitized by the following:

1. Disassociation from documentation that reveals purpose, means of acquisition, or other classifiable data not available from the imagery. Other sanitization may be necessary first.

2. Removal or deletion of descriptive data appended to, or entered on, the imagery, such as the following:

a. Identification of the organization that took the imagery might reveal the organizational level or a capability possibly requiring protection for U.S. strategic or tactical purposes.

b. Project name, nickname, or codeword might reveal the project purpose or scope of interest.

c. Category of imagery (mapping, charting, reconnaissance) might reveal the purpose, area, and scope of interest or intelligence interest.

d. Equipment used (standard nomenclature) might reveal an organizational capability possibly requiring protection for U.S. strategic or tactical purposes.

e. Focal lengths might reveal classified capabilities of the equipment used or means of acquisition.

f. Altitude might reveal classified capabilities of the equipment used or means of acquisition.

g. Platform used might reveal U.S. capabilities, purpose, area, and scope of interest; inadvertent violation of sovereign rights, international agreement, or commitments; or means of acquisition.

h. Speed of platform might reveal classified capabilities of the equipment used or U.S. military or defense capabilities warranting classification.

i. Scale, actual or approximate, might reveal classified capabilities of the equipment used or U.S. military or defense capabilities warranting classification.

j. Date and time of day might reveal U.S. capabilities, purpose, inadvertent violation of sovereign rights, or international commitments or agreements.

k. Coordinates reveal the exact location of features shown by the imagery.

1. Flight path might reveal the purpose; U.S. capabilities warranting classification; inadvertent violation of sovereign right, international agreements, or commitments; or means of acquisition.

m. Country might reveal inadvertent violation of sovereign rights, international agreements, or commitments.

n. Temperature and spatial resolution might reveal classified capabilities of equipment used, area and scope of interest, terrain features not otherwise identifiable, and data that is not readily accessible.

3. Technical adjustment of the imagery, such as the following:

a. Rectification to change the scale or obliquity to protect classifiable capabilities of the equipment used and means of acquisition.

b. Touchup to modify terrain features and conceal information on when the imagery was taken or other details.

c. Manipulation of data associated with the digital imagery would encompass, but not be limited to, areas such as digital rectification and/or derectification, deletion of such items as cross-hairs associated with specific sensors (touch-up), defocusing, introduction of noise into the image, and manipulating gray scale to degrade the image.

4. Modification of descriptive data to hide the source or means of acquisition, disguise the purpose of acquisition, obscure or misrepresent the date of acquisition, or attribute acquisition to comparable existing data of lower or no security classification.

DOWNGRADING, DECLASSIFICATION, AND PUBLIC RELEASE

A. Experienced routine users and holders of imagery who have been designated expressly by the program initiator are authorized to make imagery less sensitive or nonsensitive. They do this by removing the highly classified aspects or all classified aspects of the imagery using the sanitization process given in enclosure 5. Program initiators shall ensure these designations are limited to those with a sufficient degree of expertise to sanitize without endangering the security of the original imagery. Other users and holders of imagery, and others with questions that this Instruction may not resolve, shall consult the initiator of the plan, program, project, or operation. Initiators who are original classification authorities must advise recipients of changes in imagery classification policy, to include declassification of imagery that has not been sanitized.

B. It is essential to prevent the indefinite classification of imagery when possible. A date or event for declassification shall be determined in advance, such as: "Declassify on 1 Jan 88," "Declassify 30 days after imaging," "Declassify on Completion of the _____ (Name) Program," "Declassify one year after cessation of hostilities," or similar language, rather than "Originating Agency's Determination Required". (See DoD 5200.1-R (reference (b)).)

C. Public release of imagery is governed by enclosures 4 and 5 of this Instruction and DoD Directive 5230.9 (reference (k)).